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CAUSATION’S NUCLEAR FUTURE:
APPLYING PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY
TO THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
WILLIAM D. O’CONNELL†
ABSTRACT
For more than a quarter century, public discourse has pushed the
nuclear-power industry in the direction of heavier regulation and
greater scrutiny, effectively halting construction of new reactors. By
focusing on contemporary fear of significant accidents, such discourse
begs the question of what the nation’s court system would actually do
should a major nuclear incident cause radiation-induced cancers.
Congress’s attempt to answer that question is the Price-Anderson
Act, a broad statute addressing claims by the victims of a major
nuclear accident. Lower courts interpreting the Act have repeatedly
encountered a major stumbling block: it declares that judges must
apply the antediluvian preponderance-of-the-evidence logic of state
tort law, even though radiation science insists that the causes of
radiation-induced cancers are more complex. After a major nuclear
accident, the Act’s paradoxically outdated rules for adjudicating
“causation” would make post-incident compensation unworkable.
This Note urges that nuclear-power-plant liability should not turn
on eighteenth-century tort law. Drawing on modern scientific
conclusions regarding the invariably “statistical” nature of cancer, this
Note suggests a unitary federal standard for the Price-Anderson
Act—that a defendant be deemed to have “caused” a plaintiff’s injury
in direct proportion to the increased risk of harm the defendant has
imposed. This “proportional liability” rule would not only fairly
evaluate the costs borne by injured plaintiffs and protect a
reawakening nuclear industry from the prospect of bank-breaking
litigation, but would prove workable with only minor changes to the
Price-Anderson Act’s standards of “injury” and “fault.”
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INTRODUCTION
For the past several decades, an effective moratorium on
1
building new nuclear-power plants has silenced the nuclear industry.
The reasons for the halt in construction have included public outrage
2
3
over the Three Mile Island meltdown, increasing regulation, and
nuclear-power-plant operators’ need to insure against a multiplicity of
4
risks. Although the potential harms that the nuclear industry poses to
the public are often emphasized, the harmful uncertainty plaguing
investment in nuclear power is not. Today, nuclear power is
constantly beset by numerous unanticipated risks that it helped to
5
create, including constant media attention and the variable and
6
significant costs of building and maintaining nuclear-power plants.
Insuring against such risks has long been an immense cost of
participating in the nuclear industry.

1. Justin Gundlach, Note, What’s the Cost of a New Nuclear Power Plant? The Answer’s
Gonna Cost You: A Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Cost of New Nuclear Power Plants,
18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 630 (2011). On February 9, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission voted to permit construction of two nuclear reactors at the Vogtle nuclear-power
plant in Georgia, the first new reactors in more than thirty years. Ayesha Rascoe, NRC
Approves First New Nuclear Plant in a Generation, REUTERS, Feb. 9, 2012, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-usa-nuclear-license-idUSTRE8181T420120209.
2. Peter Behr, Three Mile Island Still Haunts U.S. Nuclear Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/03/27/27greenwire-three-mile-island-still-haunts-usreactor-indu-10327.html.
3. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, BACKGROUNDER ON THE THREE MILE
ISLAND ACCIDENT (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/
3mile-isle.html.
4. See Gundlach, supra note 1, at 630–48 (discussing the risks attending plant construction,
engineering, fuel costs, staffing, security, safety, decommissioning, licensing, and waste
management).
5. See, e.g., Jennifer Weeks, Nuclear Experts Assess How Well Media Covered Fukushima,
SOC’Y OF ENVTL. JOURNALISTS (July 15, 2011), http://www.sej.org/publications/sejournal/
nuclear-experts-assess-how-well-media-covered-fukushima (describing fervent and inaccurate
media reporting following the Fukushima incident in early 2011); Nassrine Azimi, Opinion,
Fukushima in America, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/opinion/
11iht-edazimi11.html (inquiring whether the United States has fallen into “nuclear entrapment”
and positing the Fukushima disaster as a moment of reflection for the nuclear industry); Scott
Waldman, Cuomo’s Complicated Indian Point Equation, CAPITAL N.Y. (Apr. 7, 2014, 9:50
AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/magazine/2014/04/8543109/cuomos-complicatedindian-point-equation (contrasting the Indian Point nuclear-power plant’s favorable safety
record with resistance to relicensing from prominent environmental groups and the governor of
New York).
6. See Gundlach, supra note 1, at 631–53 (describing uncertain costs incurred as a result of
plant engineering, project financing, construction delays, staffing, plant safety and security, and
subsequent litigation).
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Congress first addressed the complex risks of nuclear power by
7
enacting the 1954 Atomic Energy Act (AEA), creating a licensing
8
regime that permitted civilians to use nuclear fuel for the first time.
Congress then amended the AEA in 1957 through the Price9
Anderson Act (PAA), mandating that nuclear licensees carry private
insurance to hedge against the risk of liability that could result from a
10
major nuclear incident. In recent years, a senescing cadre of nuclear11
power plants —which provide 19.4 percent of the country’s escalating
12
energy needs —has overshadowed the industry. Reacting through the
13
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress has enacted policies to spur
further investment in nuclear technologies, providing financial
assistance in the form of production tax credits, low-interest federal
loans, and insurance insulating many reactors from the costs of
14
regulatory and licensing delays. But as companies seek to site,
develop, and maintain these plants over the next half-century, one
little-studied threat for the nuclear industry and the public has been
15
glossed over: the risk of civil litigation itself.
Over the years, Congress has somewhat mitigated the cost of
litigating claims of radiation-related harm to third parties from
nuclear licensees—companies working with nuclear materials—by
16
requiring them to carry significant liability insurance. These

7. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
8. See id. at § 53(a) (permitting the Atomic Energy Commission to issue licenses for
domestic possession of “special nuclear material”); John V. Buffington, Underwriting the
Ultimate Tort, 87 DICK. L. REV. 679, 682 (1983) (observing that private possession of nuclear
fuel was prohibited until the 1954 AEA).
9. Atomic Energy Damages Act (Price-Anderson Act), Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576,
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2012).
10. 1 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS 13 (1990), available at http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news/rpccna.
11. See Gundlach, supra note 1, at 623 (observing that all nuclear reactors operating in the
United States were ordered in the 1960s and 1970s).
12. US Nuclear Generating Statistics, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/
Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/US-Nuclear-Power-Plants/US-Nuclear-GeneratingStatistics (last updated Apr. 14, 2014).
13. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, § 638, 119 Stat. 594, 791–94, 42 U.S.C. §
16014 (2012).
14. JAY M. GUTIERREZ & ALEX S. POLONSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 97–98 (2d ed. 2007).
15. For a discussion of the history of and claims in Price-Anderson Act suits, see infra
Part I.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1) (2012) (requiring licensees to hold financial protection in
“the amount of liability insurance available from private sources”); 78 Fed. Reg. 41,835, 41,836
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requirements compel nuclear licensees to carry liability insurance
indemnifying them in any judgment for harms to third parties up to a
17
statutory maximum. Today, administrative remedies are used to
address many of the harms caused by radioactive materials to
uranium miners, as well as military personnel and civilians near
18
nuclear-test sites. But Congress utilized a separate statutory
framework—the PAA—to impose liability for harms to the general
19
public.
Under the PAA, private plaintiffs may sue for physical or
economic harms arising from the “hazardous properties of radioactive
material” emitted from a nuclear-power plant, a fuel-fabrication
operation, a uranium mill, or any similar facility during a “nuclear
20
incident.” The PAA’s litigation mechanism is the so-called “public
21
22
23
liability” lawsuit, a complex, one-way, exclusive ticket to federal
24
court. PAA suits usually take the form of class actions because
radioactive materials may disperse widely and affect large

(July 12, 2013) (codified at 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4) (2014)) (increasing the primary financialprotection layer to $375,000,000 to reflect inflation).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (requiring deferred, retrospective insurance premiums assessed
against the nuclear industry in the event of a major nuclear incident).
18. See infra notes 204–09 and accompanying text.
19. This Note focuses on the PAA, the exclusive means of remedying claims by third
parties arising out of a nuclear incident, rather than the distinct disaster-relief services provided
by federal agencies or nongovernmental organizations. For example, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is tasked with executing emergency plans to protect the public
from imminent harm. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
PROGRAM,
http://www.fema.gov/radiological-emergency-preparednessprogram (last updated June 19, 2014). Such agencies would be unlikely to address the cost of
compensating injuries or cleaning up the reactor site. E.g., Entergy Nuclear Generation Co., No.
50-293-LR, 2012 WL 1207269, at *3 (N.R.C. Mar. 30, 2012).
20. For a description of the effects of an internal accident at a nuclear-power plant, see
generally Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law,
2011 BYU L. REV. 1937 (2011).
21. Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation? The SixtyThree Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
22. See, e.g., Richard Goldsmith, Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear Power, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 163 n.11 (1991) (describing statutory provisions of the PAA as
“complex”); Joel Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for
Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REV. 498, 517 (1981) (same).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2012) (permitting the removal of public liability suits from
state court to federal court).
24. See id. (creating federal jurisdiction for the district in which the “nuclear incident [took]
place”); Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1553 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that members of the
general public harmed by radiation from a nuclear-power plant can “sue under the PriceAnderson Act . . . or not at all”).
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25

populations in nearby areas. Unlike a car collision or a badly built
widget, any physical harms imposed by radiation emissions are
impossible to see, slow to materialize, and virtually untraceable to a
single identifiable cause. Indeed, litigating a PAA suit is a forensic
kabuki dance: all players know that proving “causation” is a matter of
probability and not of fact, yet both parties mechanically act out the
motions of a tort suit at common law.
This Note tackles the hardship that the PAA’s common-law
causation rules would create in the wake of a major nuclear incident.
Whether the incident should result from an intentional act such as a
26
terrorist attack or as the unintended consequence of a reactor
malfunction, such an event might cause damage in excess of $100
27
billion. Relying on the rich history of smaller radiation-injury suits
litigated to date, this Note argues that the PAA’s causation rule
should impose liability directly in proportion to the statistical chance
of increased harm to third parties. Such a rule not only forces the
nuclear-power industry to pay directly for negative externalities
imposed on the public, but dispels the specter of bank-breaking
judgments that could bring a slowly developing industry to its knees.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the provisions
of the PAA, explains how defendants pay for and settle public
liability lawsuits, and surveys decades of litigation. Part II provides an
overview of how radiation harms humans, focusing on the
probabilistic effects of low-level radiation exposure. Part III contrasts
two methodologies for applying scientific understandings of
28
radiation-induced cancers to the ill-fitting burdens of proof required
to demonstrate specific causation in U.S. courts. It shows that
combining epidemiological data with the traditional preponderanceof-the-evidence standard would bar the claims of all injured plaintiffs,
but that relying on individualized clinical evidence would overdeter
defendants. Part IV observes that the all-or-nothing causation rules of
state tort law are inapposite to public liability suits because conclusive
links between a particular instance of injury and a particular radiation
25. For a summary of major class-action litigation, see infra Part I.C.
26. For an overview of the potential aftermath of a terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor, see
generally Jason Zorn, Note, Compensation in the Event of a Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power
Plant: Will Victims Be Adequately Protected?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1087 (2004).
27. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
28. Recognizing the uncertainty inherent in identifying the cause of any incidence of
cancer, this Note will use the term “radiation-induced” to refer not only to cancers that were in
fact caused by radiation, but those that hypothetically could have been caused by radiation.
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source cannot be proven. Part IV further argues that implementing a
“proportional liability” standard would benefit all parties by tying
recovery directly to the excess risks imposed on plaintiffs. Finally,
Part V addresses obstacles to implementing proportional liability,
proposing modifications to the PAA’s “fault” and “injury” standards
that would prevent plaintiffs and defendants from manipulating the
effects of current PAA law on a proportional liability regime.
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF PUBLIC LIABILITY SUITS UNDER THE
PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
The Price-Anderson Act is one of the most complicated, least
understood, and least used laws I have encountered in all my years
in the House. Yet its purpose is simple and its role is important.
Quite simply, the Price-Anderson Act ensures that adequate funds
will be available to compensate the public in the event of a nuclear
29
accident.

Before the AEA’s enactment in 1954, the federal government
30
carefully guarded the secrets of nuclear power. In his 1953 speech,
“Atoms for Peace,” President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised that
nuclear power could be harvested “to provide abundant electrical
31
energy in the power-starved areas of the world” through paving the
32
way for private commercial development. Despite Eisenhower’s
proclamation that the AEA would turn “swords into plowshares” by
33
allowing private peaceful applications for nuclear energy, would-be
investors nonetheless voiced concerns that potential profits from

29. 133 CONG. REC. 21,414 (1987) (statement of Rep. Udall).
30. See Berkovitz, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that prior to the enactment of the AEA, the
federal government held a “monopoly over nuclear materials and their use”).
31. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address Before the General Assembly of the United
Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City (Dec. 8, 1953), in PUB. PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1953, at 813, 821 (1954).
Notably, contemporary projections suggested no immediate need for nuclear reactors. Rather,
“[t]he prevailing sense of urgency . . . reflected instead the fear of falling behind other nations in
fostering peaceful atomic progress.” J. SAMUEL WALKER & THOMAS R. WELLOCK, A SHORT
HISTORY OF NUCLEAR REGULATION, 1946-2009, at 2 (2010), available at
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1029/ML102980443.pdf.
32. Buffington, supra note 8, at 681–82.
33. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190,
193 (1983).
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nuclear energy were limited, whereas its potential liabilities were
34
immense.
Congress quelled investors’ unease over the risks of nuclear
35
power by enacting the PAA in 1957. The PAA requires reactor
licensees to purchase the “maximum amount of liability insurance
available” to insure themselves against potential injuries to third
36
parties. Licensees are permitted to use these insurance funds to
37
cover the costs of litigating and settling claims. Recognizing that
38
damages—potentially ranging as high as $100 billion today —might
exceed the total available insurance, the Atomic Energy Commission
39
40
(AEC) indemnified licensees up to another $500 million. Beyond
that value, damages were entirely “capped,” preventing the public
41
from receiving additional compensation.
A. The Nuclear Industry’s Transition from Governmental Indemnity
to Private Insurance
Through subsequent amendments, Congress required the nuclear
industry to internalize the costs of potential harms to the public. In
1975, just over two decades after the AEA was passed, Congress
42
largely ushered the government out of the nuclear-insurance

34. See, e.g., Harold Green, Nuclear Power, Risk, Liability, Indemnity, 71 MICH. L. REV.
479, 480–81 (1973) (recognizing the dual problem for investors of a remote potential for profit
“in the relatively remote and uncertain future” and the “major roadblock” of liability to the
public).
35. Id. at 483–87.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)–(b) (2012).
37. Financial Protection Requirements and Indemnity Agreements, 10 C.F.R. § 140.3(d)
(2013).
38. Hypothetical scenarios have damages ranging from $10 billion to $100 billion. Michael
G. Faure & Tom Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic
Analysis of the U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 219, 266 (2009).
39. The AEC was divided into an energy-research arm and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in 1974. WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 31, at 49.
40. Id. at 15–16.
41. Id. The Supreme Court found the liability cap compliant with due-process and equalprotection principles. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 87, 93
(1978).
42. Although the United States no longer directly indemnifies private nuclear licensees,
limiting the total compensation awardable to the public can still be visualized as an effective
subsidy to the industry. For further discussion and explanation, see infra note 51.

O’CONNELL IN FC (DO NOT DELETE)

340

11/21/2014 6:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:333

business, replacing publicly guaranteed indemnity with privately
43
funded insurance pools.
Today, the first layer of compensation available in a public
liability suit remains fixed at the maximum insurance available to a
44
single nuclear licensee. This limitation is currently set at $375 million
45
per reactor by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and
American Nuclear Insurers (ANI)—a nuclear-insurance pool largely
46
comprised of domestic property-casualty insurance companies. If a
nuclear incident caused more than $375 million in damages, a second
47
layer of compensation would activate. At this stage, every other
nuclear licensee in the United States would contribute up to $127
48
million per reactor to finance a large-scale litigation or settlement
through additional pro rata charges known as “retrospective
premiums,” which would be assessed against each nuclear reactor
49
following an accident by any one of them. Accordingly, as more

43. See Berkovitz, supra note 21, at 14–15 (describing how the 1975 PAA amendments
reduced the federal indemnity of $560 million by the amount of funding that nuclear licensees
could obtain through private insurance and payment of retrospective premiums). Once the
private funding available exceeded $560 million, federal indemnity no longer existed. Thus,
although the PAA still addresses indemnification of private licensees in § 2210(c), that section
no longer requires governmental indemnity. See id. at 15 (“[O]nce the federal indemnity had
been eliminated, the liability limit would increase as the number of operating reactors increased.
The layer of federal indemnity was eliminated upon the licensing of the 80th reactor in 1982.”).
Unlike private nuclear-reactor licensees, Department of Energy contractors remain directly
indemnified by the federal government. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d)(2) (2012) (“[T]he Secretary . . .
shall indemnify the persons indemnified against such liability above the amount of the financial
protection required, in the amount of $10,000,000,000 . . . .”). The activities of such contractors
are beyond the scope of this Note.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (2012).
45. Need for Nuclear Liability Insurance, AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS 2 (Oct. 2013),
http://www.amnucins.com/library/Nuclear%20Liability%20in%20the%20US.pdf.
46. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER
RELIEF 1 (June 2014), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheets/nuclear-insurance.pdf. As an alternative to the investor-held ANI, nuclear licensees were
able to insure through a policyholder-owned mutual-insurance pool. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 13–14. But ANI has been the only
nuclear-insurance pool in the United States since 1998. Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 38,
at 254. Nuclear operators insure themselves against direct, on-site damage through a separate
insurer, Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited. Id.
47. Id.
48. AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS, supra note 45, at 2. Insurance premiums for the primary
layer of financial protection are approximately $1.1 million per reactor per year. U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 46, at 1.
49. Berkovitz, supra note 21, at 6.
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reactors are licensed in the United States, each licensee can expect to
50
benefit from a larger pool of secondary liability insurance.
Taking both layers into account, $13.6 billion is currently
available for a public liability lawsuit arising out of a major nuclear
51
52
incident, in addition to a likely congressional backstop. Because the
second layer is paid directly by all plant owners, it serves as a
deterrent and penalty leveled against nuclear operators, reducing the
potential for moral hazard present in many insurance schemes.
Furthermore, because the whole industry becomes liable in part for
the tortious acts of each participant, the PAA’s scheme encourages
industry actors to monitor other operators’ compliance with
53
regulatory standards.
B. The Price-Anderson Act’s Requirement that Federal Courts Apply
Exclusively State Law
The first public liability suits hardly differed from common-law
54
tort claims and were litigated in state courts until the Three Mile
55
Island (TMI) incident. At that time, federal jurisdiction was
available only if the NRC determined that the case resulted from an
50. Id. at 6–7.
51. AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS, supra note 45, at 2. The debate over the adequacy of the
compensation fund for a major incident has received significant attention. See generally Michael
Faure & Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis of the Nuclear Liability Subsidy, 26 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 419 (2009) (deeming the PAA’s liability limit “less distorting” than its international
counterparts, but nonetheless inadequate); Daniel Meek, Note, Nuclear Power and the PriceAnderson Act: Promotion over Public Protection, 30 STAN. L. REV. 393 (1978) (arguing that the
fund’s then-current compensation scheme, similarly structured but with a liability cap less than
one-tenth of today’s amount, was “grossly deficient” in the 1970s). But see generally Joseph
Marrone, The Price-Anderson Act: The Insurance Industry’s View, 12 FORUM 605 (1977)
(considering the 1970s compensation fund adequate); Zorn, supra note 26 (finding
compensation adequate in a terrorist attack on a nuclear-power plant).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (2012) (“In the event of a nuclear incident involving
damages in excess of the amount of aggregate public liability under paragraph (1), the Congress
will . . . take whatever action is determined to be necessary . . . to provide full and prompt
compensation to the public for all public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such
magnitude.”).
53. See Faure & Vanden Borre, supra note 38, at 272 (observing an incentive for reciprocal
monitoring because “any low quality operation will lead to increased financial exposure” for
other operators).
54. See Berkovitz, supra note 21, at 4 (“The Act did not create a federal cause of action for
damages arising out of a nuclear incident, and it did not alter any of the rules of state law that
might apply.”).
55. See, e.g., Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 863 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(holding that common-law tort claims brought in state court against a radiopharmaceutical plant
were not barred by federal preemption of nuclear regulation).
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56

“extraordinary nuclear occurrence” (ENO). Because the statute
imposed no timeline on deciding whether an incident was an ENO, it
relegated plaintiffs to an “unusual jurisdictional limbo” between state
57
and federal courts until the NRC issued a ruling. In the TMI
litigation, a district court held that Congress intended federal
jurisdiction to cover “borderline” cases as long as an ENO was
58
alleged in good faith. The Third Circuit ultimately reversed this
59
holding.
Following the Third Circuit’s ruling, and after over three
thousand plaintiffs brought more than one hundred cases in both
60
federal and state courts, representatives from both sides of the
litigation testified before Congress that it would be more efficient if
all nuclear accidents, regardless of size, were litigated in federal
61
district courts. Congress amended the PAA to so provide in 1988,
62
imbuing all nuclear incidents with federal jurisdiction. The
amendments also enacted procedural mechanisms for increasing the
63
efficiency of PAA suits, such as caseload-management panels.
Once a case arrives in federal court, however, the PAA does not
provide substantive federal law for adjudicating the suit. As early as
the 1960s, Congress considered creating a federal system of nuclear
tort law to adjudicate PAA cases with greater certainty and
64
uniformity. But the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy balked at
the effort and advised Congress to retain state tort rules in public
56. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“Accordingly, unless the diversity statute applied or the action resulted from an ‘extraordinary
nuclear occurrence,’ nuclear-related tort claims typically could not proceed in federal court.”).
57. In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433, 437 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
58. See id. at 435–38 (holding that federal district courts have jurisdiction over “lawsuits
seeking damages from a nuclear incident of the magnitude of TMI.”).
59. See Stibitz v. Gen. Pub. Util. Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 996 n.3, 997 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that, except for ENOs, the PAA did not provide for federal jurisdiction); Kiick v. Metro. Edison
Co., 784 F.2d 490, 493 (3d Cir. 1986) (same).
60. S. REP. NO. 100-218, at 13 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1476, 1488.
61. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2012) (creating federal jurisdiction and allowing removal to
federal court for cases “resulting from a nuclear incident”); id. § 2014(q) (defining “nuclear
incident” as an injury “resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous
properties of source, special, nuclear, or byproduct material”).
63. See id. § 2210(n)(3) (granting the chief judge of the district court with jurisdiction over
the case permission to create management panels of other district and appellate judges if the
case has an “unusual” impact on the work of the court or if the aggregate public liability is
great); id. § 2210(n)(3)(C) (permitting management panels to consolidate cases, establish claim
priority, and assign cases to judges or special masters).
64. S. REP. NO. 89-1605, at 9 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3201, 3209.
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65

liability cases. The Supreme Court ultimately followed suit, adopting
66
a policy of minimal interference with state law. In Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
67
Commission, the Court acknowledged that many of Congress’s
actions—such as the creation of the AEC—suggested that the entire
field of nuclear safety was preempted. Nonetheless, the Court
observed that states remained free to regulate activities such as
68
nuclear-power-plant licensure on economic grounds. The Court then
69
ruled in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. that federal law permitted
punitive-damage awards for radiation-related injuries as long as they
70
were permitted under state law. Today, federal courts ruling on
PAA claims continue to apply the substantive law of the state in
which the nuclear incident occurred unless doing so would be
71
inconsistent with the PAA.
C. Modern Price-Anderson Act Cases Evincing Rising Costs and
Significant Complications
For the first two decades of the PAA’s existence, public liability
suits were inexpensive and straightforward to litigate, particularly for
the nuclear industry. A spreadsheet tracking expected, hypothesized,
and settled lawsuits contains just over one page addressing claims
resolutions before 1980, and those claimants were indemnified for
72
under $2 million in total. Because of the absence of notable nuclear
incidents in the United States for the first two decades of the PAA,
nuclear insurers were even able to return much of their required

65. See id. (“[T]he committee does not believe it is necessary to go to the length of enacting
substantive law . . . to achieve these ends.”). The Joint Committee believed that a waiver of
defenses at the fault stage was sufficient to resolve legal uncertainties in major incidents, and
that new federal law on causation and damages would be excessive. Id. at 3209–10.
66. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-1605, at 6 (1966), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3201, 3206 (“Since
its enactment by Congress in 1957 one of the cardinal attributes of the Price-Anderson Act has
been its minimal interference with State law.”).
67. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983).
68. Id. at 216.
69. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
70. Id. at 246–58. The PAA does prohibit punitive-damage awards when the United States
must indemnify a defendant such as a government contractor. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (2012).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2012).
72. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT—CROSSING THE
BRIDGE TO THE NEXT CENTURY 85 (1998).

O’CONNELL IN FC (DO NOT DELETE)

344

11/21/2014 6:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:333
73

insurance premiums after reserving them for ten-year increments.
But on March 28, 1979, the reactor-core meltdown at TMI changed
the public’s perception of the industry as Americans watched
residents within a five-mile radius of the nuclear-power plant
74
evacuate their homes. The President’s Commission on the Accident
75
76
at Three Mile Island as well as private research institutions
independently investigated potential health effects experienced by
nearby residents. Though a consensus emerged that public exposures
77
were negligible, the TMI incident nonetheless sparked increased
78
distrust of the nuclear industry. The ensuing litigation settled for $71
79
million. A 1997 Congressional report on the Price-Anderson Act
found that TMI accounted for more than half of what ANI had then
80
paid to resolve all lawsuits dating back to 1957.
In courts throughout the country, the claims against the TMI
plant and its operators prompted similar litigation against other
nuclear-power plants and NRC licensees. In addition to the TMI
suits, the Third Circuit decided cases stemming from uranium81
processing and waste-disposal activities in western Pennsylvania.

73. Id. at 82. In the 1950s and 1960s, insurers generally returned 95 to 99 percent of reserve
premiums. The refund rate for 1969 premiums, which were due to be paid out after the TMI
incident in 1979, fell to a historic low of 27.9 percent. The return rate recovered to 70 percent
over the next fifteen years. Id. at 83.
74. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 3.
75. JOHN G. KEMENY ET AL., STAFF REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE
ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 1 (1979).
76. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 3 (“[C]omprehensive
assessments by several well respected institutions, such as Columbia University and the
University of Pittsburgh, have concluded . . . the actual release had negligible effects on the
physical health of individuals or the environment.”).
77. Id.; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 72, at xvii.
78. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 3.
79. NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., INSURANCE: PRICE-ANDERSON ACT PROVIDES EFFECTIVE
LIABILITY INSURANCE AT NO COST TO THE PUBLIC 1 (2012), available at
http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/Price_Anderson_Act_Sept_2012.pdf.
80. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 72, at 84 (concluding that ANI
had spent approximately $131 million on indemnity and defense costs by 1997, of which $70
million related to the Three Mile Island incident). By 2008, ANI had spent $304 million in
indemnity and litigation expenses. Marjorie Berger, Managing Nuclear Risks in the United
States: INLA Inter Jura Congress 2009, AM. NUCLEAR INSURERS 8 (2014), available at
http://www.amnucins.com/library/INLA-2009.pdf.
81. Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 716, 734 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (granting a
motion for a new bellwether trial in a several-hundred-plaintiff suit against now-defunct fuelfabrication facilities); McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 896
F. Supp. 2d 347, 351 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (addressing discovery motions in nine newly filed multiplaintiff suits by community residents against the same facilities).
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The Ninth Circuit ruled on thousands of claims relating to cancers
allegedly caused by radioiodine emissions at the Hanford plutonium82
production facility in Washington as well as class-action and single83
plaintiff suits against rocket-testing facilities in southern California.
The Sixth Circuit addressed suits alleging an increased risk of cancer
and property damage from emissions at a nuclear-weapons facility in
84
Ohio, culminating in the creation of a settlement fund and lifetime
85
medical monitoring for former employees. In Kentucky, employees
at uranium-enrichment facilities and nearby residents sued plant
86
owners, alleging “subcellular” harm and property damage. Finally,
87
claims against uranium mills in Colorado and New Mexico and the
88
Cook v. Rockwell International Corp. case against the Rocky Flats
89
nuclear-weapons-production facility near Denver transformed the
Tenth Circuit into the primary stomping ground of recent public
liability suits.
In such recent public liability suits, the financial threat to the
nuclear industry has been significant. By 2009, ANI had paid out $300
90
million, and an additional $80 million settlement with a former
91
operator was still being litigated. Although ANI has historically

82. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir. 2007).
83. O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2002).
84. Day v. NLO, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 40, 41 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
85. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
90; Tim Bonfield, History Repeats Itself, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 11, 1996,
http://enquirer.com/fernald/stories/021196c_fernald.html.
86. See Smith v. Carbide & Chems. Corp., 507 F.3d 372, 374–77 (6th Cir. 2007)
(summarizing residents’ property claims for water and soil contamination); Rainer v. Union
Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 611, 613 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing allegations of “future harms”
that could result from damage to DNA).
87. See Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165, 1166 (10th Cir. 2010) (reviewing
personal-injury claims against a uranium mill); June v. Union Carbide Co., 577 F.3d 1234, 1236–
38 (10th Cir. 2009) (addressing personal-injury and medical-monitoring claims against a
uranium- and vanadium-mining company); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1217–20 (10th
Cir. 2003) (ruling on trespass, negligence, nuisance, and emotional-distress claims against a
uranium mill); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1500–01 (10th Cir. 1997) (reviewing
jurisdiction in a suit by Navajo Nation against a nearby uranium mill); Boughton v. Cotter
Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 825 (10th Cir. 1995) (addressing medical-monitoring claims against a
uranium mill).
88. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2010).
89. See id. at 1133 (ruling on property claims brought by nearby residents); Building &
Constr. Dept. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993) (ruling on medicalmonitoring claims by former employees and unions).
90. Berger, supra note 80.
91. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Am. Nuclear Insurers, 76 A.3d 1, 3–7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
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retained almost $300 million in litigation reserves, the threat of
bank-breaking judgments continues to haunt its member operators,
particularly in cases with little apparent merit. Epitomizing this threat
is the Cook case against the Rocky Flats nuclear-weapons-production
facility in Denver, in which the jury awarded roughly $1 billion in
compensatory and punitive damages for alleged plutonium
93
contamination of the plaintiffs’ property. At trial, the linchpin of the
plaintiffs’ strategy was for experts to explain that any radioactive
contamination on their property, no matter how small, could cause an
94
increase in the risk of getting cancer. Ultimately, the lower court
instructed the jury that no appreciable health risk needed to be shown
95
in order for plaintiffs to recover. If paid in full, the judgment would
have greatly exceeded the plant’s first layer of liability, forcing
96
nuclear operators nationwide to contribute more than $600 million.
After it was reversed on appeal, the case was remanded, then reappealed on the issue of whether the PAA inherently preempts state
97
law claims based on the same facts.
Furthermore, the complex legal issues plaguing public liability
suits have often caused plaintiffs’ claims to languish without any hope
of a court reaching a final judgment. Indeed, suits against
Washington’s Hanford Nuclear Reservation, the “nation’s most
98
contaminated area,” were first filed in 1990, and bounced between
99
the district and appellate courts for more than eighteen years.
Notwithstanding favorable bellwether verdicts for two thyroid-cancer

92. See Price-Anderson Act Reauthorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp.,
Infrastructure, and Nuclear Safety of S. Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 107th Cong. 57
(2003) (statement of John L. Quattrocchi, Senior Vice President for Underwriting, Am. Nuclear
Insurers) (noting that ANI then held $282 million in reserve for indemnity and defense of
outstanding claims).
93. COOK V. ROCKWELL INT’L CORP., VERDICT PROFILE 1 (2013), available at Bloomberg
Law.
94. Cook, 618 F.3d at 1134.
95. See id. (“Plaintiffs are not required to show that plutonium is present on the Class
Properties at any particular level or concentration, that they suffered any bodily harm because
of the plutonium, or that the presence of plutonium on the Class Properties damaged these
properties in some other way.”).
96. See supra notes 41–42.
97. Transcript of Record at 197, Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 14-1112 (10th Cir. Mar.
26, 2014), ECF No. 1.
98. Gerald F. Hess, Hanford: Cleaning Up the Most Contaminated Place in the United
States, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 180 (1996).
99. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 995 (9th Cir. 2008).
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100

claimants, later settlement offers made to other residents with
101
thyroid disease in the Hanford cases were relative pittances.
Overall, little of the money paid by nuclear insurers supports claims
settlements. Excluding the payouts from TMI, twenty-three times as
102
much has been expended on legal fees as on compensation.
As discussed further in Part III, the cost, duration, and perceived
unfairness of adjudicating public liability suits under the PAA partly
results from the difficulty of deciding whether a nuclear-power plant’s
103
radiation releases have “caused” a particular injury. Indeed, in 1990,
the Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents (the
Presidential Commission), which was tasked with suggesting potential
changes to the PAA, found that the “principal problem” with
compensating public liability claims is “the difficulty of proving or
104
defending such claims on the issue of causation in fact.”
Individualized causation issues in public liability suits are extensively
105
litigated through “prediscovery” orders,
through summary106
107
and through Daubert hearings
at which
judgment motions,
competing experts vie for the judge’s ear on the causes of radiationinduced cancers. These experts disagree over the factual

100. See id. at 1000, 1017 (affirming judgments totaling approximately $550,000 in favor of
thyroid-cancer plaintiffs).
101. See Hanford Down-Winder Pursues a Settlement for Exposure to Radioactive Fallout,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 8, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/06/
hanford_down-winder_pursues_a.html (reporting thyroid-cancer settlements ranging from
$10,000 to $15,000); Hanford Offers Sent to Hundreds, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Apr. 1, 2012,
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/apr/01/hanford-offers-sent-out (reporting eighty-six
hypothyroid-disease-settlement offers totaling $524,600).
102. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 72, at 92. In comparison,
administrative costs in the much-maligned asbestos litigation only exceeded compensation paid
to plaintiffs by a two-to-one ratio. Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass
Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 953 (1993).
103. See, e.g., Marcie Rosenthal, How the Price-Anderson Act Failed the Nuclear Industry,
15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119, 127 (1990) (“Victims of a nuclear accident have the burden of
proving causation. This poses a difficult, if not impossible challenge to plaintiffs seeking
compensation from radiation-induced injuries.”).
104. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
101.
105. See infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
106. E.g., Cotroneo v. Shaw Envtl. & Infrastructure, Inc., 639 F.3d 186, 192–93 (5th Cir.
2011) (granting summary judgment for lack of a causal nexus between radiation exposure and
injury); Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Grp., 528 F.3d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).
107. For a paradigmatic and methodical analysis of radiation dose experts in a public
liability suit, see In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666–722 (3d Cir. 1999).
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108

circumstances of radiation exposure, the rates at which radiation
109
exposure causes cancer, and whether certain radionuclides can
110
cause cancer at all. To date, the federal courts of appeals have been
unable to agree on issues of specific causation because, as discussed
previously, the PAA paradoxically defers these substantive questions
111
to state tort law.
II. RADIATION AS SCIENTIFIC CAUSE
A brief primer on radiation’s health effects on humans is
essential to understand how scientific theories of causation diverge
from their legal counterparts. Radiation consists of the emission of
112
alpha particles, beta particles, or gamma rays from unstable nuclei
113
as they decay. Such emissions—called ionizing radiation—cause
“ionization” by knocking electrons from their orbits, creating
114
additional charged particles. These emissions can directly and
indirectly damage structures within the human body as cells are
disrupted or killed by the ionizing radiation itself, and as energy is
115
transferred to cells triggering second-order chemical changes.

108. See, e.g., id. at 659–61 (contrasting studies by defendants and the Pennsylvania
Department of Health showing no exposures above NRC limits with the plaintiffs’ experts’
theory of a “blowout” plume of radioactive gases that evaded nearby radiation monitors).
109. See, e.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2008)
(assessing differing testimony from plaintiffs and defendants as to whether thyroid cancer can
be caused by less than forty rads of radiation exposure).
110. See, e.g., McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d
347, 356–57 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (addressing defendants’ objections that there is insufficient
evidence to demonstrate that unenriched uranium is a human carcinogen).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2012). In the words of one commentator, “Price-Anderson
simply works to defer responsibility and resolution of important issues.” Rosenthal, supra note
103, at 127.
112. An alpha particle consists of two protons and two neutrons, JAMES E. TURNER,
ATOMS, RADIATION, AND RADIATION PROTECTION 61 n.3 (3d ed. 2007), whereas beta particles
are electrons emitted from the nucleus of an atom, id. at 65. Gamma rays are electromagnetic
radiation emitted as photons from nuclei after radioactive decay. Id. at 68.
113. Id. at 58–71.
114. Id. at 109, 139. Non-ionizing radiation produced by microwaves and radios is not
thought to cause long-term health effects because it lacks sufficient energy to do so.
Microwaves, Radio Waves, and Other Types of Radiofrequency Radiation, AM. CANCER SOC’Y,
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/radiationexposureandcancer/radiofrequencyradiation (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). Most studies show that radiofrequency waves from cell
phones cannot cause DNA damage, and are therefore not a cancer risk. Cellular Phones, AM.
CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/athome/cellularphones (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
115. TURNER, supra note 112, at 408.
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Acute radiation syndrome may kill or damage enough cells to
cause lasting harm to bodily tissues and organs, and can be lethal
116
when critical organs are exposed to sufficiently high doses. Doses of
117
one to three gray may lead to “[m]ild to severe nausea, malaise,
anorexia, [or] infection.” Exposures of three to six gray can result in
“hemorrhaging, infection, diarrhea, epilation, [and] temporary
118
sterility,” and exposures in the range of 3.5 gray or more can be
119
fatal. Receiving more than six gray impairs the nervous system, and
more than ten gray incapacitates the exposed individual, generally
120
resulting in death. The symptoms of the resultant “acute radiation
syndrome” are deterministic: whether or not they will occur can be
assessed based on dosage and conditions of exposure, although their
121
manifestations may vary somewhat from person to person.
Exposure to lower doses of ionizing radiation leads to so-called
122
“delayed somatic effects.” Such effects are stochastic, rather than
deterministic—there is a chance, but not a certainty, that injury will
123
develop based on the level of exposure. Most notable is the
potential damage to the controls regulating cellular division in human
124
DNA, resulting in uncontrolled cellular growths. After a latency
period—often ranging between two and ten years—such growths may
125
manifest as cancer. The prevailing analysis of this process for solid
126
cancers, embraced by major health-physics societies, is the “linear
no-threshold” (LNT) model, which states that even de minimis

116. Id. at 419.
117. The gray, the “international system (SI) unit of radiation dose expressed in terms of
absorbed energy per unit mass of tissue,” is equivalent to 100 rads. Gray (Gy), HEALTH
PHYSICS SOC’Y, http://hps.org/publicinformation/radterms/radfact79.html (last updated Aug. 13,
2014).
118. TURNER, supra note 112, at 421.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 410, 419–21.
122. Id. at 421–23.
123. Id. at 421–22.
124. Id. at 429.
125. Id. at 421–22.
126. Underlying the LNT model are the findings of the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements, and the National Academy of Sciences that DNA damage is strictly
proportional to dosage at “reasonably low” doses of radiation. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA
RADIOGENIC CANCER RISK MODELS AND PROJECTIONS FOR THE U.S. POPULATION 6 (2011),
available at http://epa.gov/rpdweb00/docs/bluebook/bbfinalversion.pdf.
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Although “the
exposure has the potential to cause cancer.
probability that cancer will result from [a given exposure] increases
128
proportionally with [the] dose,” not all forms of cancer are alike.
Some cancers, like red-blood-cell and bone-marrow leukemias, and
lung, skin, thyroid, breast, or stomach cancers, are more strongly
129
linked to radiation exposure.
Although some radiation-induced cancers may be attributable to
nuclear-power production, most result from a variety of mundane
130
sources of radiation. Each year, the public is exposed to radiation
131
from radon, cosmic rays, medical devices,
and even banana
132
consumption. Unlike a chemical product, which may be traceable to
a particular manufacturer, different sources of radiation are not
distinguishable, nor is there any noticeable difference between
cancers caused by nuclear-power production and those caused by
133
other sources of radiation.

127. Id. The National Research Council’s BEIR VII Committee employed a linearquadratic model for leukemia, TURNER, supra note 112, at 422, although epidemiological data
are also consistent with the linear model at low doses, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 126,
at 10–15. In contrast to the LNT model, “adaptive response” theories suggest that exposure to
very low levels of radiation may actually trigger bodily defense mechanisms that fight cancerous
and precancerous mutations. See TURNER, supra note 112, at 429 (“In some systems, a small
dose of radiation (e.g., several mGy) triggers a cellular response that protects the cells from a
large dose of the radiation given subsequently.”); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 126, at 11
(“[L]ow-dose radiation may stimulate defense mechanisms, which could be beneficial in
preventing cancer or other diseases.”). Furthermore, some courts have rejected the LNT model
because it is an extrapolation from cancer risks experienced at higher levels of exposure. See
Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (summarizing
district-court cases rejecting the LNT theory).
128. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 642 (3d Cir. 1999).
129. Radiation Exposure and Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/
cancer/cancercauses/othercarcinogens/medicaltreatments/radiation-exposure-and-cancer (last
visited Oct. 22, 2014).
130. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
101.
131. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 126, at 13–14.
132. See Doses in Our Daily Lives, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/radiation/around-us/doses-daily-lives.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2014) (describing average radiation doses from medical procedures and ingested food).
133. See TURNER, supra note 112, at 468 (“[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, to attribute a
given malignancy in a person to his or her past radiation history. Diseases induced by radiation,
from either natural or man-made sources, also occur spontaneously.”); id. at 410 (“Although we
might be able to predict the magnitude of the increased incidence, we cannot say which
particular individuals in the population will contract the disease and which will not.”).
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III. RADIATION AS LEGAL CAUSE
In public liability suits, plaintiffs must prove causation under the
134
tort laws of the state in which the incident occurred. Under most
states’ common law, toxic-tort plaintiffs must show “generally” that
exposure to a substance can cause their injury and “specifically” that
135
exposure in fact did cause the injury. General causation is satisfied
136
by showing that a form of cancer may be attributable to radiation.
Specific causation is more problematic because it requires showing
that the defendant’s emissions were the most likely cause of the
137
plaintiff’s injury. Some courts have interpreted this standard to
mean that a plaintiff must show a preponderance of the evidence—at
least a 50 percent likelihood that the defendant’s emissions caused the
138
plaintiff’s injury.
A. The Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Rule
For some substances that were the subject of previous toxic-tort
litigation, plaintiffs could feasibly prove causation above the 50
percent threshold—by a preponderance of the evidence—if the
plaintiffs suffered “signature injuries” sufficiently rare that a jury
merely needed to know that the injury existed to pair it with its cause.
For example, women exposed in utero to the morning-sickness
medication diethylstilbestrol (DES) were significantly more likely to
139
develop a very rare form of cancer. Because studies estimated that

134. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2012).
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. g (2010).
136. See, e.g., June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1245 (10th Cir. 2009) (observing
in a PAA case that general causation requires the plaintiffs to show that radiation had the
“capacity” to cause their cancers).
137. See, e.g., Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Grp., Inc., 528 F.3d 681, 683 (noting that a
PAA plaintiff must show that exposure to radiation “in fact” caused his injuries). Showing
specific causation is problematic because it is “highly individualistic, and depends on the
characteristics of individual plaintiffs (e.g. state of health, lifestyle) and the nature of their
exposure.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987).
138. See Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (W.D. Tex. 2005)
(“Courts adopting such a requirement [to show “doubled risk”] have found that the
requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show
that the incidence of an injury or condition . . . was more than double the incidence in the
unexposed or control population.”).
139. Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68
VA. L. REV. 713, 718 (1982). Interestingly, men exposed to DES in utero do not appear to bear a
noticeable increase in cancer risk. See William H. Strohsnitter, Kenneth L. Noller, Robert N.
Hoover, Stanley J. Robboy, Julie R. Palmer, Linda Titus-Ernstoff, Raymond H. Kaufman,
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DES caused seven out of every eight such cancers in young women,
defendants could be said to have caused the injury in the
140
overwhelming majority of instances. Similarly, in the long-running
asbestos litigation, proving causation is less difficult because of the
141
relative rareness of mesothelioma. By contrast, given that radiationinduced cancers have no “signature” origin, the simple
preponderance standard has proven problematic to implement and
difficult to meet.
As discussed below, courts have taken two approaches to
implementing the preponderance standard in public liability suits.
Accepting that the process of attributing causes to cancer is purely
statistical, some courts apply what mass-torts scholars call the “weak”
preponderance rule, requiring plaintiffs to rely on epidemiological
studies showing that it is more than 50 percent likely that the
142
plaintiffs contracted cancer from a particular source. Others apply a
“strong” preponderance rule, focusing on individualized assessments
of a plaintiff’s lifestyle and exposure to other substances to decide
143
whether the plaintiff’s cancer is connected to the alleged exposure.
B. The Preponderance Rule and Epidemiological Evidence
In cases in which courts apply a preponderance rule relying
purely on the incidence of disease in the general population, masstort plaintiffs cannot prevail unless the defendant exposed them to a
144
so-called “doubled dose,” which doubled their risk of injury. Ruling
on remand in the infamous Bendectin litigation, Judge Alex Kozinski
explained:

Ervin Adam, Arthur L. Herbst & Elizabeth E. Hatch, Cancer Risk in Men Exposed In Utero to
Diethylstilbestrol, 93 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 545, 549–50 (2001) (finding no increased prevalence
of many cancers, but unclear results for testicular cancer).
140. Chemicals; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community Right-to-Know; Proposed
Significant New Use Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,020, 41,026 (Sept. 8, 1992) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 372 & 721). For the DES plaintiffs, the infamous problem was not proving that DES
caused their cancers, but proving which particular defendant sold the product that harmed them.
Robinson, supra note 139, at 719.
141. See, e.g., Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the
argument that the asbestos manufacturer did not cause the plaintiff’s injury because
“mesothelioma is extremely rare among persons not exposed to asbestos”).
142. See infra Part III.B.
143. See infra Part III.C.
144. McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., No. 10-cv-143, 2014 WL
814878, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2014) (noting the Third Circuit requirement that exposure
levels “exceeded the normal background level”).
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[T]ort law requires plaintiffs to show not merely that Bendectin
increased the likelihood of injury, but that it more likely than not
caused their injuries. . . . Because the background rate of limb
reduction defects is one per thousand births, plaintiffs must show
that among children of mothers who took Bendectin the incidence
145
of such defects was more than two per thousand.

Judge Kozinski concluded that because the plaintiffs’ causation
experts could not provide evidence that Bendectin was the most likely
146
cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, summary judgment was appropriate.
The plaintiffs fared only slightly better in the Agent Orange litigation,
in which Judge Jack Weinstein found a settlement appropriate
because, in part, no individual plaintiff could have proved at trial that
his or her chances of developing cancer from the defoliant exceeded
147
50 percent.
Two recent Tenth Circuit decisions ruling on public liability suits
illustrate the ongoing problems associated with equating a
preponderance standard with a 50 percent threshold. In June v. Union
148
Carbide Corp., residents of a uranium- and vanadium-mining town
in Colorado sued the former mill operators, alleging that the mills’
operations caused their cancers and that the plaintiffs were likely to
149
develop cancers in the future. The plaintiffs relied on specificcausation experts who opined that airborne uranium and vanadium
tailings would be “substantial factors” in the cancers if the tailings
constituted at least 5 to 10 percent of the plaintiffs’ total radiation
150
exposure. However, Colorado tort law, in line with the Restatement
151
(Second) of Torts, requires a “substantial factor” to be sufficient on

145. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted).
146. Id. at 1322.
147. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“It is
likely, however, that even if plaintiffs as a class could prove that they were injured by Agent
Orange, no individual class member would be able to prove that his or her injuries were caused
by Agent Orange. . . . The probability of specific cause would necessarily be less than 50%
based upon the evidence submitted.”).
148. June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009).
149. Id. at 1236–37.
150. Id. at 1246.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965) (“If two forces are actively
operating, one because of the actor’s negligence . . . and each of itself sufficient to bring about
harm to another, the actor’s negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it
about.”).
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152

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit
its own to cause the injury.
concluded that no individual in the class could demonstrate that the
153
defendant’s radiation specifically caused the individual’s cancer.
One year later, in an analogous uranium-mining case, Wilcox v.
154
Homestake Mining Co., the plaintiffs’ specific-causation expert
alleged more substantial “assigned share” figures, stating that there
was up to a 45 percent probability that the defendants’ uranium
155
mining caused the plaintiffs’ cancers. The Tenth Circuit, employing
156
similar reasoning as in its June decision, held that New Mexico law’s
“substantial factor” causation also required that the defendant’s
157
conduct be sufficient to cause plaintiffs’ cancers on its own. As in
June, a 45 percent probability that the defendant caused the plaintiffs’
158
injuries still fell short of satisfying the preponderance rule.
Applying the preponderance rule in cases relying on
epidemiological studies creates great difficulties for plaintiffs, who
usually cannot prove that they were exposed to a “doubled dose” of
159
radiation. Even in heavily exposed populations, such as survivors
who were within twenty-five-hundred meters of the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki atomic-bomb blasts, the increased chance of developing
160
161
solid tumors was no more than 10 percent on average. In contrast,

152. June, 577 F.3d at 1244–45. The Restatement (Third) abandoned the “substantial factor”
test because it tended to conflate the distinct factual-causation and proximate-causation
analyses. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. j (2000). But the Restatement (Third) still requires a factual cause of injury to be a “but-for”
cause of the harm standing “alone.” Id. at § 27; June, 577 F.3d at 1239 (“[T]he ultimate legal
standards in the two Restatements are essentially identical for our purposes.”).
153. See June, 577 F.3d at 1247 (“Plaintiffs . . . have never (not even in this court) contended
that they have produced evidence that Uravan radiation was a necessary component of a causal
set that probably would have caused the Plaintiffs’ ailments.”).
154. Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010).
155. Id. at 1171 (Lucero, J., concurring in part).
156. See id. at 1170 n.2 (majority opinion) (“Although our opinion in June was based on
Colorado law and we are applying New Mexico law in the instant case, we interpret New
Mexico law to require the same showing of but-for causation that was required in June.”).
157. Id. at 1170.
158. Id.
159. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10,
at 110 (noting that the chance that a cancer was caused by a fixed radiation exposure is “well
below 50 percent even for exposures in the tens of rads range”); cf. David Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97
HARV. L. REV. 849, 858 (1983) (“The excess risk caused by exposure to a toxic agent frequently
does not exceed the background risk . . . .”).
160. A solid tumor, or solid cancer, is an “abnormal mass of tissue that usually does not
contain cysts or liquid areas,” as with sarcomas, carcinomas, or lymphomas. Solid Tumor, NAT’L
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the maximum annual dose of radiation that a facility is permitted to
162
discharge to a member of the public is extremely low. Even at a
one-time dose one hundred times the regulatory limit, the chance that
a later-developed cancer is attributable to the event may be
163
approximately one in forty-two.
In single-plaintiff cases, a simple preponderance rule for
radiation-related injuries can be justified. After all, if a line must be
drawn somewhere, the 50 percent mark seems like a reasonable place
to draw it: such a rule prevents recovery when the claimant’s injury
164
likely came from another source. In a class-action suit for radiationrelated injury, however, the preponderance rule no longer holds
water. Assuming that the defendants have exposed the public to some
degree of risk, the judge must decide not merely whether a plaintiff
was harmed or not, but how many plaintiffs were harmed, and who
those plaintiffs are. Given enough plaintiffs and a notable increase in
cancer risk, it becomes virtually certain that some plaintiffs were
harmed, though no particular plaintiff would ever prevail. Compare
Judge Jack Weinstein’s hypothetical in the Agent Orange Litigation:

CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/dictionary?cdrid=45301 (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). Such
cancers are contrasted with blood cancers like leukemia, which do not result in solid tumors.
161. See Solid Cancer Risks Among Atomic-Bomb Survivors, RADIATION EFFECTS
RESEARCH FOUND., http://www.rerf.jp/radefx/late_e/cancrisk.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014)
(“For the average radiation exposure of survivors within 2,500 meters (about 0.2 Gy), the
increase is about 10 percent above normal age-specific rates.”).
162. See Dose Limits for Individual Members of the Public, 10 C.F.R. § 20.1301 (2013)
(fixing the maximum annual radiation dose from a nuclear facility to a member of the public at
0.1 rem).
163. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH RISKS FROM EXPOSURE TO LOW LEVELS OF
IONIZING RADIATION, BEIR VII PHASE 2, at 7 (2006) (predicting that forty-two out of every
one hundred people will be diagnosed with cancer, but that only one such cancer would result
from a one-time exposure to 0.1 sievert of radiation above background levels). 0.1 sievert is one
hundred times the accepted dose limit for members of the public in the United States. See
Radiation Term: Sievert (Sv), HEALTH PHYSICS SOC’Y, http://hps.org/publicinformation/
radterms/radfact137.html (last updated Aug. 13, 2014) (“One sievert is equivalent to 100 rem.”).
164. For example, the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program
creates a federal compensation fund that employs a 50 percent causation threshold for former
DOE employees at nuclear-weapons-manufacturing and nuclear-weapons-testing facilities.
NIOSH Radiation Dose Reconstruction Program: Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocasfaqs.html (last updated
Sept. 26, 2014). But members of “special exposure cohorts” with radiation-induced cancers at
designated facilities receive compensation irrespective of the probability that the facility caused
their cancers. NIOSH Radiation Dose Reconstruction Program: Special Exposure Cohort, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocassec.html (last
updated Sept. 26, 2014).
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Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a population of
10 million persons exposed to their product. Assume that among this
population 1,000 cancers of a certain type could be expected, but
that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is “statistically significant,”
permitting a reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers are due to the
product of the manufacturers. In the absence of other evidence, it
might be argued that as to any one of the 1100 there is only a chance
of about 9% (100/1100) that the product caused the cancer. Under
165
traditional tort principles no plaintiff could recover.

For torts on the scale of nuclear-reactor malfunctions—where
the harm is inherently generic, lacks a signature, and bears a long
latency period—the preponderance rule will generally severely
166
undercompensate claimants.
In the past, defendants have taken particular advantage of the
low likelihood that any plaintiff’s cancer has been caused by nonbackground sources. One defense strategy, adopted from similar
mass-tort suits, has been to seek specific “pre-discovery” disclosures
167
explaining each individual’s theory of exposure. These Lone Pine
168
orders may require plaintiffs to identify the precise radionuclides
that caused their injuries, the biological pathways of exposure,
individualized dose estimates, and scientific and medical evidence
169
supporting the plaintiffs’ exposure theory. Plaintiffs argue that Lone

165. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
166. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 881 (“In cases in which the probability of causation
does not exceed fifty percent, the strong and weak versions of the rule both deny victims all
recovery and thus unjustly enrich defendants. When the probability of causation exceeds fifty
percent, the rule simply reverses the burden of inequity.”). Of course, if the probability that the
plaintiffs’ cancers were caused by the defendant is just over 50 percent, the inequity is reversed:
the defendant has caused only half of the plaintiffs’ injuries, but will pay for all of them.
167. See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 604 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006)
(“Lone Pine orders . . . are pre-discovery orders designed to handle the complex issues and
potential burdens on defendants and the court in mass tort litigation by requiring plaintiffs to
produce some evidence to support a credible claim.”). In Exxon Mobil, the court affirmed a
denial of class certification in a suit involving a chemical-plant fire because the plaintiffs’
affidavits failed to show that formulaic calculations could be applied broadly enough to satisfy
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s predominance and superiority requirements. Id. at
604–05.
168. The technique is named for its use in Lore v. Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986
WL 637507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. Nov. 18, 1986). Such orders may require plaintiffs to
present expert affidavits estimating the severity of their injuries. Steering Comm., 461 F.3d at
604 n.2.
169. McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350
(W.D. Pa. 2012); see also Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2000)
(affirming a grant of summary judgment because 1600 plaintiffs in a PAA suit failed to present
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Pine orders force them to proffer information reserved for discovery
170
at the pleading stage, whereas defendants claim that detailed
exposure information should be considered essential to bringing a
171
PAA claim in the first place.
C. The Preponderance Rule and Individualistic Evidence
Rather than relying solely on statistical evidence, some courts
appear to operate under the belief that jurors, endowed with an
ability approaching divination, can identify whether and which
individuals were harmed by their exposures to the defendants’
radioactive emissions. In such suits, Plaintiff A might be able to prove
causation by a preponderance of the evidence with a doctor’s
testimony that a “differential diagnosis” eliminates all alternative
172
sources of cancer.
That is, Plaintiff A could prevail by
demonstrating to the jury that he was the improbable individual
173
whose cancer was caused by the defendant. For example, in the
Hanford Nuclear Reservation cases, in which the Ninth Circuit
addressed whether Washington residents were exposed to
radionuclides emitted from the world’s first large-scale plutonium174
manufacturing facility, the court concluded that it was inappropriate
for the trial court to require statistical proof of a greater-than-50percent probability of causation because certain “individualized
factors, such as heredity . . . might raise the likelihood of contraction
175
of cancer at lower levels of exposure.” The court suggested that
although epidemiological statistics from exposed populations might
adequate, individualized information regarding the nature, circumstances, and attribution of
their injuries).
170. See, e.g., Acuna, 200 F.3d at 340 (“Plaintiffs contend that the pre-discovery orders
requiring expert support for the details of each plaintiff’s claim imposed too high a burden for
that stage of litigation.”).
171. See id. at 340–41 (“The scheduling orders issued below essentially required that
information which plaintiffs should have had before filing their claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b)(3).”).
172. See Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 (W.D. Pa. 1999)
(“Differential diagnosis is a methodology used to determine causation of a disease suffered by
an individual, based on efforts to consider and exclude all possible alternate causes.”).
173. See, e.g., id. (permitting plaintiffs’ experts to prove specific causation by ruling out
alternate causes through differential diagnosis in spite of defendants’ objections that no specific
radiation doses were alleged).
174. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1126–28 (9th Cir. 2002).
175. Id. at 1137. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the lower court had erred by addressing
the question of epidemiology statistics at the general-causation phase rather than at the specificcausation phase. Id. at 1134–35.
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be insufficient to demonstrate that the defendants caused plaintiffs’
cancers, individualized forms of proof could conclusively demonstrate
that the defendants caused certain instances of plaintiffs’ cancers but
176
not others.
Arguably, some jurors may find a doctor’s specific testimony
about the source of a plaintiff’s cancer to be persuasive. Furthermore,
they may have greater confidence in the resulting judicial decision
because they perceive that the judicial system’s role is to determine
conclusively whether a defendant is the legal cause of a plaintiff’s
177
injury. Expectations of certainty from simpler tort cases, such as car
accidents, may carry over into the mass-tort realm, particularly when
178
ensconced in the confidence of a medical professional. The notion
that a doctor can conclusively attribute a cancer to a particular cause
through differential diagnosis, however, has been soundly
179
debunked. In public liability suits, clinical assessments are helpful
only in the sense that they inform the statistical likelihood that
plaintiffs contracted cancer from a particular source. As the Third
Circuit observed in the TMI cases:
[M]edical evaluation, by itself, can neither prove nor disprove that a
specific malignancy was caused by a specific radiation exposure.
Therefore, the primary basis to link specific cancers with specific
radiation exposures is data that has been collected regarding the
increased frequency of malignancies following exposure to ionizing
radiation. In other words, causation can only be established (if at all)

176. See In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing cases from various
circuits employing non-epidemiological evidence to establish causation). Berg was decided the
same day as Hanford, and consisted of claims by plaintiffs severed from its companion case. Id.
at 1129.
177. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 873 (hypothesizing that courts’ demands for
particularized evidence might “buttress the system’s legitimacy by promoting a public
perception that verdicts are based on more than probabilities” and “reinforce the image of a
neutral, nonpolitical, and nonredistributional system”).
178. See id. at 872 (suggesting that the preference for individualized rather than broader
statistical evidence indicates courts’ “desire that judgments in mass tort cases rest upon a higher
degree of certainty about the causal connection than they normally do in sporadic accident
cases”).
179. See id. at 869 (“The short answer to the demand for ‘particularistic’ evidence of
causation in mass exposure cases is that no such evidence can be produced.”); id. at 870 (“The
concept of ‘particularistic’ evidence suggests that there exists a form of proof that can provide
direct and actual knowledge of the causal relationship between the defendant’s tortious conduct
and the plaintiff’s injury. ‘Particularistic’ evidence, however, is in fact no less probabilistic than
is the statistical evidence that courts purport to shun . . . .”).
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from epidemiological studies of populations exposed to ionizing
180
radiation.

Radiation-protection scientists are in agreement that differential
diagnosis cannot confidently identify the ultimate source of a
plaintiff’s cancer. For example, the National Council on Radiation
181
Protection and Measurements (NCRP) has concluded that
[i]n the absence of biological markers of radiation it is generally not
possible to make [a causation] determination with a high level of
confidence since cancers may, and do, occur in the absence of
exposure to a particular carcinogen of interest, including ionizing
radiation, and, conversely, may and do fail to occur in the presence
182
of exposure.

The Committee on Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
183
(BEIR)
similarly recommends the use of purely statistical,
184
probability-of-causation assessments. Combined publications of the
185
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) recommend probabilistic models for
186
identifying causes of radiation exposure.
The probability-ofcausation approach is also consistent with the Federal Judicial
187
Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, subject to certain

180. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 643 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
181. The NCRP is a private radiation-protection and health-science organization chartered
by Congress in 1964. About NCRP, NAT’L COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROT. & MEASUREMENTS,
http://www.ncrponline.org/AboutNCRP/About_NCRP.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
182. NAT’L COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROT. & MEASUREMENTS, NCRP REPORT NO. 171:
UNCERTAINTIES IN THE ESTIMATION OF RADIATION RISKS AND PROBABILITY OF DISEASE
CAUSATION 194 (2012).
183. BEIR is a committee of the United States National Research Council that provides
information to the government regarding the effects of ionizing radiation. NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 163, at vii.
184. Id. at 265.
185. The IAEA is an independent international organization affiliated with the United
Nations that fosters cooperation in the nuclear field. About the IAEA: The “Atoms for Peace
Agency,” INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.iaea.org/About/about-iaea.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2014).
186. INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, APPROACHES TO ATTRIBUTION OF DETRIMENTAL
HEALTH EFFECTS TO OCCUPATIONAL IONIZING RADIATION EXPOSURE AND THEIR
APPLICATION IN COMPENSATION PROGRAMMES FOR CANCER 11 (2010).
187. See Michael D. Green, D. Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 611–16 (3d ed. 2011)
(describing the role of epidemiological evidence in the courtroom).
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188

caveats. The Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear
Accidents, established to make recommendations for improving the
189
PAA’s compensation methodology for a large-scale nuclear event,
considered the probability-of-causation approach “the best available
190
proxy for direct proof of . . . causation.”
Ultimately, permitting reliance on differential diagnoses
artificially strengthens those cases in which plaintiffs lack the
epidemiological evidence necessary to demonstrate that the
defendant’s emissions created a measurably increased risk of harm.
For example, in the TMI litigation, the cost of adjudicating and
settling plaintiffs’ claims for economic and physical injuries exceeded
191
$70 million, though the President’s Commission on the Accident at
Three Mile Island concluded that no civilian radiation exposures were
192
expected to have any health effects.
In Cook v. Rockwell
193
International Corp., a jury awarded nearly $1 billion in punitive and
194
compensatory damages on the basis of evidence that radionuclide
releases from a government-operated nuclear-weapons plant posed a
195
“small and unquantifiable” risk of harm. Overall, permitting public
liability suits under the PAA to proceed on the theory that a jury can
identify who has and who has not been harmed is not only
unscientific, but poses a serious danger to the viability of the nuclearpower industry after a significant incident.
IV. MODERNIZING CAUSATION IN PUBLIC LIABILITY SUITS
This Note proposes that the failings of traditional preponderance
rules require changes to the substantive law governing radiationinjury torts under the PAA. Although other proposals may be
imagined, torts scholars and governmental agencies addressing
188. The use of epidemiological evidence is subject to factors such as the validity of the
study, similarity between the studied group and the plaintiff, whether exposure accelerates preexisting conditions, and whether the toxic agent operates independently of other causes. Id. at
612–15.
189. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
1.
190. Id. at 101.
191. The Price-Anderson Act: Background Information, AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y 3 (2005),
available at http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf.
192. See KEMENY ET AL., supra note 75, at 12, 34 (finding that the expected increase in
cancer rates will be either zero or undetectable).
193. Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2010).
194. COOK V. ROCKWELL INT’L CORP., supra note 93, at 1.
195. Cook, 618 F.3d at 1134.
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analogous issues in the context of other mass torts have often focused
on one of two potential solutions: subsuming the tort claims into an
administrative framework or modifying the burden of proof required
for an actionable injury.
A. Conversion to an Administrative Process
To resolve the cost, complexity, and unfairness of using
traditional tort principles in mass-tort cases, some scholars advocate a
196
transition to administrative compensation regimes. Given that the
court-applied law of causation is more amenable to simple, two-party
torts, proposals to shift to administrative compensation regimes
suggest that mass torts would benefit from the simplicity and speed
associated with successful twentieth-century policies such as workers’
197
compensation and no-fault insurance.
Such an approach is
especially applicable to judges and juries hard-pressed for the time
and understanding necessary to absorb scientific doctrines regarding
198
the cause of an injury
or the intricacies of nuclear-power
199
regulation. In theory, cases that require comprehension of complex
radiological principles might be better resolved by an administrative
200
system than by a legal factfinder.
In the past, administrative schemes created for compensating the
victims of the September 11 attacks, children harmed by defective
196. See generally Betsy J. Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief: A Proposal for a
Permanent Compensation System for Domestic Terrorist Victims, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 663 (2006) (proposing a permanent, no-fault compensation scheme for domestic victims
of terrorist attacks); Jon D. Hanson, Kyle D. Logue & Michael S. Zamore, Smokers’
Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for Federal Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 519 (1998) (suggesting a national “Smokers’ Compensation” fund); Linda S. Mullenix &
Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Fund Approaches to
Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121 (2002) (contrasting the idiosyncrasies of
the September 11th fund with those of other major administrative regimes and suggesting that
effective compensation systems are highly tort-specific); Rabin, supra note 102 (addressing
issues that would arise in creating an administrative compensation scheme for all mass torts).
197. Rabin, supra note 102, at 970.
198. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 926 (“Given that judges usually lack expertise in
using and evaluating scientific information, their retention of the preponderance rule . . . in mass
exposure cases raising complex medical and epidemiological issues may be a subtle admission of
institutional incompetence.”).
199. Cf. Yellin, supra note 22, at 494–97 (arguing for scientific experts to review nuclearpower regulations because “[n]uclear power cases . . . involve risks flowing from a technology
whose environmental implications are not yet fully understood, thus raising matters of
technological and scientific prediction with which the judiciary has generally been
uncomfortable”).
200. Id.
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vaccines, and injured dockworkers have successfully accelerated
recovery for nationwide incidents that might otherwise have
201
languished in the court system for years. The mass torts that would
most benefit from an administrative compensation regime tend to
share characteristics making them amenable to nonjudicial resolution.
Often, such mass torts result from a single discrete, compensable
event, involve a large number of plaintiffs who bear a similar injury,
202
and are easily traceable to the defendant in question.
Another argument in favor of an administrative compensation
regime for injuries sustained as the result of nuclear-power
production is that Congress has already evinced a preference for
supporting employees at nuclear facilities through similar
compensation funds. For example, the Energy Employees
203
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA)
created a no-fault compensation fund for DOE employees engaged in
204
weapons production and testing.
Former employees receive
$150,000 and medical benefits if the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) determines that their
cancers are “at least as likely as not” due to the employee’s
205
occupational exposure. For “[s]pecial [e]xposure [c]ohort[s]” at
206
certain facilities, it is unnecessary to prove causation at all.
Similarly, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990
207
(RECA) establishes an administrative process for compensating
those formerly employed in uranium mines and those present onsite
208
or downwind of nuclear-test sites. RECA provides a cheap and
efficient alternative to litigation, rendering proof of causation

201. Mullenix, supra note 196, at 123–38, 141–43.
202. Rabin, supra note 102, at 964–65.
203. Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106398, 114 Stat. 1654 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384–7385s-15).
204. Radiation Dose Reconstruction: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), The Act
(EEOICPA), NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
ocas/faqsact.html (last updated May 11, 2010).
205. Id.
206. JOSEPH FALCO, ENERGY EMPLOYEES OCCUPATIONAL ILLNESS COMPENSATION
PROGRAM (EEOICPA) 7 (2011), available at http://www.bnl.gov/community/cac/docs/
CAC_11_11_Falco.pdf.
207. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note (2012).
208. Id. § 2210 note (establishing a trust fund as well as an administrative-claims-submission
process with judicial review in the district courts); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
RADIATION
EXPOSURE
COMPENSATION:
ACCOUNT
OF
JUSTICE’S
PROGRAM
ADMINISTRATION, at 4 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232669.pdf.
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unnecessary, and requiring instead that an individual be shown to
209
have worked or resided in a designated area.
In 1990, the Presidential Commission explicitly considered
whether administrative procedures might be superior to judicial
processes in compensating claimants in the event of a major nuclear
210
The committee found several benefits to adopting
incident.
administrative procedures, including that an agency-administered
scheme would accelerate compensation, conserve judicial resources,
and limit the use of experts to resolving technical questions of nuclear
211
science and medicine.
This approach would avoid repeated
deliberations over the same scientific questions across jurisdictions,
212
and its scope could be expanded or constricted as necessary. Indeed,
the PAA already bears certain characteristics of such an
213
administrative mechanism, permitting a no-fault approach in the
214
event of an ENO, and distributing compensation from a shared, but
215
limited, insurance pool.
However, in line with the findings of the Presidential
Commission, it is difficult to conclude that enacting a rigid
administrative compensation scheme under the PAA would be wise.
Concerned citizens, a nuclear-industry lobbyist, a prominent torts
scholar, and a major judicial figure in the history of mass-tort
litigation all advised the Presidential Commission that the lack of
public accountability and visibility inherent in any administrative
mechanism would strain its credibility in the event of a major nuclear
216
incident. In contrast, judicial procedures endow litigants with their
“day in court,” and can be flexibly adapted to the unique

209. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/civil/common/reca.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
210. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
34.
211. Id. at 34–35.
212. Id. at 35.
213. Rabin, supra note 102, at 955–58.
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (2006) (authorizing indemnity agreements requiring nuclear
operators to waive “any issue or defense” relating to their conduct or fault in the event of an
“extraordinary nuclear occurrence”).
215. See id. § 2210(a) (requiring the purchase of primary and secondary financial protection
from a nuclear insurer).
216. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10,
at 35 nn.9–10 (recording the testimony of Public Citizen Congress Watch representative Pamela
Gilbert, lobbyist Daniel Berger, Professor Robert Rabin, and Judge Jack Weinstein).
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Even if an
circumstances giving rise to a nuclear incident.
administrative mechanism would be appropriate, it is unclear whether
218
it would be constitutional —for example, it might violate injured
219
plaintiffs’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Ultimately, the
characteristics that render certain mass torts suitable for
administrative compensation are absent from radiation-related
injuries, which vary significantly in form, may derive from non220
tortious sources, and are difficult to trace to a particular defendant.
B. Judicial Procedures Utilizing “Risk-Based” Causation
Recognizing the distorting effect of traditional notions of
causation, some scholars recommend continued judicial involvement
in mass-tort suits, but suggest that the preponderance rule should be
221
replaced with a “proportional liability” approach. Rather than fully
compensating all plaintiffs with a greater-than-50-percent chance of
proving causation and offering no compensation below that
threshold, a proportional liability rule compensates plaintiffs in direct
proportion to the excess risk of injury imposed by the defendant’s
222
activities. Such a rule appears particularly well suited for public
liability cases, in which the ultimate “identity” of an injury is

217. Id. at 36.
218. The PAA previously survived due-process and equal-protection challenges when its
compensation limits were found not to be arbitrary or irrational, but rather a “classic example of
an economic regulation” designed to incentivize growth in the nuclear industry. Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978).
219. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51 (1989) (“Congress’ power to
block application of the Seventh Amendment to a cause of action has limits. Congress may only
deny trials by jury in actions at law, we said, in cases where ‘public rights’ are litigated: . . . e.g.,
where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute
creating enforceable public rights.”).
220. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Samuel D. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New
Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 281 (1960) (proposing a contribution to a
“contingent injury fund” in proportion to the increased risk of latent diseases from radiation
exposure); Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 859 (advocating the use of aggregative judicial
procedures and proportional liability in mass-tort cases); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over
Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587, 589 (1985) (arguing that
imposing liability in proportion to the probability of causation encourages desirable social
behavior).
222. Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 859.
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biologically inseparable from the increased risk caused by the
223
defendant.
The aims of the tort system are better served by tying damages in
public liability suits to the proportional-liability standard. From a
rights-based perspective, compensation should seek to provide
“corrective justice” to plaintiffs by protecting their entitlements from
224
violations by others. Because the tort system normally provides only
retrospective compensation, monetary damages are equivalent to a
225
forced sale of the claimants’ entitlements. By contrast, tying
recovery to an individual’s increased risk of harm provides a
contemporary measurement of the damage imposed by defendants,
and would even permit courts to intervene before a claimant suffers
226
bodily injury. In terms of maximizing utility, the proportionalliability rule deters defendants to the degree of increased risk of harm
227
they impose on the public. Although the proportional-liability rule
breaks with tradition by compensating for risk rather than injury, the
approach not only parallels the total damages imposed on plaintiffs
by increased cancer incidence, but lowers the defendant’s risk of a
disproportionately large judgment by preventing plaintiffs from being
overcompensated—as they may be under the current system of all-or228
nothing judgments.
A proportional-liability rule would address plaintiffs’ chances of
developing cancer by imposing costs based on their total increase in
229
risk, even in the absence of conclusive proof of specific causation.
Although such an approach provides a more accurate assessment of
230
any implementation that compensates
the defendant’s fault,
223. See Estep, supra note 221, at 269 (observing that radiation is not amenable to “normal
proof rules” because it “only increases the incidence of such injuries in an exposed group”); id.
at 281 (proposing proportional liability for radiation-related injuries).
224. Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 877.
225. Id. at 878.
226. For a discussion of measures that might eliminate or mitigate harm to plaintiffs’
entitlements before cancer develops, see infra notes 262–64 and accompanying text.
227. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 883–84 (“Unlike the preponderance rule,
proportional liability never holds a defendant responsible for more or less than the loss the
defendant wrongfully caused.”).
228. Because proportional-liability regimes may hold a defendant liable for all degrees of
increased risk, other limitations—such as a minimum risk-of-injury threshold or fault standard—
are necessary to prevent suit by all individuals with a marginally increased chance of being
harmed. See infra Part V.
229. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
230. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 884 (“Because it represents an actuarial average, the
excess risk accurately expresses the peril to the entire population . . . .”).
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individual plaintiffs for increased risk could also increase the
attendant transaction costs of litigation by incentivizing suits that
would otherwise not be brought, awarding compensation to parties
231
exposed to negligibly increased risks of harm. To prevent low-risk
plaintiffs from receiving a windfall, practical implementations of
proportional liability would require reducing a plaintiff’s total
recovery as the probability that the defendant caused his cancer
decreases and possibly aggregating his recovery with that of other
232
plaintiffs to fund socially beneficial programs.
Moreover, proportional liability is not merely a theoretical
construct, but a causation methodology with existing support from the
judiciary and the Presidential Commission. For example, in assessing
the fairness of the famous Agent Orange Settlement, Judge Jack
Weinstein recommended applying proportional liability to avoid
denying recovery class wide when statistical evidence indicated that
some of the plaintiffs’ injuries must have been caused by the
233
defendants.
In 1990, the Presidential Commission specifically
recommended that Congress amend the PAA to implement
234
proportional liability. The Presidential Commission proposed that
public liability suits would first trigger offsite assessments of the
estimated radiation doses to which the public was allegedly
235
exposed.
Plaintiffs would then be fully compensated if the

231. See id. at 866 n.65 (“As long as liability remains an all-or-nothing proposition, lowering
the threshold can only exacerbate the danger of overdeterrence.”).
232. See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 837 (suggesting 9 percent of the amount of full
compensation is owed for a 9 percent increase in the risk of injury); PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON
CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at 107–08 (rejecting a proposal to
provide some compensation to all cancer claimants in favor of compensating only those claims
with sufficiently high likelihoods of causation, and paying lesser amounts to claims with
relatively lower likelihoods of causation). For a discussion of the purpose of cumulating
plaintiffs’ recoveries, see infra notes 262–66.
233. See Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 837–38, 842 (offering a solution in a class action to
try all of the plaintiffs’ claims together and hold the defendant “liable to each exposed plaintiff
for a pro rata share of that plaintiff’s injuries”).
234. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
101.
235. Id. at 103. Because “dose reconstruction” assessments occur during discovery, they are
generally factual contests between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts regarding each claimant’s
total exposure. See, e.g., McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 896 F.
Supp. 2d 347, 365 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (granting a Daubert motion to exclude plaintiffs’ dosereconstruction expert); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 997–98, 1014
(9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the DOE’s “Dose Reconstruction Project” to assess the total
radiation exposure surrounding Hanford might have been “biased” by the litigation, but that
plaintiffs stipulated to its accuracy). A better approach might be to require both parties to
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probability that their cancers were caused by the incident exceeded 50
percent, and compensated at diminishing amounts down to a floor of
236
20 percent, below which no compensation would be due. Among
other reasons, the Presidential Commission considered a
proportional-liability rule appealing because it had already funded
epidemiological “summary tables” used to assess the excess risk
237
attributable to specific levels of radiation exposure. Today, NIOSH
still maintains web-based variants of these tables to calculate the
likely increased risk of developing cancer for DOE employees and
238
contractors exposed to varying levels of radiation.
Although recovery in direct proportion to increased risk
provides a more accurate measure of a defendant’s liability than the
preponderance rule, the effectiveness of compensating for “risk”
rather than “injury” can be reduced by two opposing litigation
239
strategies. First, if fewer than all exposed plaintiffs sue, proportional
240
liability will not adequately deter nuclear licensees. Defendants pay
no more in damages when unmeritorious plaintiffs bring claims, yet
comply with the assessment of a neutral third party, subject to independent oversight. See
COMM. ON AN ASSESSMENT OF CDC RADIATION STUDIES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A
REVIEW OF THE RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS CORPORATION’S FERNALD DOSE
RECONSTRUCTION REPORT (1997) (disclosing the National Research Council’s review of dose
assessments performed by a private third-party corporation pursuant to a memorandum of
understanding signed by the defendant DOE).
236. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
108. Although the Commission also advanced a proposal to fully compensate nearby cancer
claimants who could show an increased risk of injury of 20 percent or more, it felt that the
proposal suffered from the same flaws as the undesirable alternative of full compensation to all
nearby cancer claimants. Id. at 107–08.
237. Id. at 109.
238. See Interactive Radioepidemiological Computer Program (ICRP), NAT’L CANCER
INST., http://dceg.cancer.gov/tools/analysis/ircp (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
239. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 881 (observing that proportional liability
radically alters traditional causation rules and may confer windfalls on uninjured plaintiffs). For
a criticism of the proportional-liability approach from the era of the Presidential Commission’s
proposal, see generally Louis A. Cox, Jr. & Joseph R. Fiksel, A Critical Review of the
Probability of Causation Method, in THE PRICE-ANDERSON LAW: REPORTS ON PRICEANDERSON ISSUES (ANI/MAELU ed., 1985).
240. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 919 (emphasizing that the long latency period from
exposure to injury leads disease victims to sue at different times, which may “substantially
frustrate the system’s deterrence and compensation objectives”). Deterrence could also be
achieved by plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, which are permitted by the PAA if authorized
by state law, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258–59 (1984), as long as the
government is not required to indemnify the defendant, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (2012). But punitive
damages, aimed exclusively at “retribution and deterrence,” may—subject to due-process
limitations—exceed and therefore overcompensate plaintiffs for merely potential injuries. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–17 (2003).
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they inevitably pay less in damages if some class of exposed
claimants—such as those who have not yet developed cancer—fails to
241
sue. Second, without some minimum standard of exposure below
which plaintiffs cannot sue, enterprising attorneys may be
incentivized to bring large class actions consisting of plaintiffs with de
242
minimis exposure in order to vex defendants or extract a settlement.
Thus, although proportional-liability theory is sound, one important
consideration is whether the PAA can accommodate any changes
necessary to ensure its success in practice.
V. IMPLEMENTING PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY:
ROADBLOCKS AND SOLUTIONS
Since their inception, public liability suits have relied on the
traditional preponderance rule of causation taken from state tort
243
law. Because the PAA was enacted and amended with this
limitation in mind, two changes may be required to address the
practical success of a proportional-liability rule. First, in order to
impose sufficient deterrence costs on defendants, plaintiffs must be
able to sue for their increased risk of injury before they develop
cancer. Consistent application of this rule would require resolution of
an ongoing dispute in the federal courts of appeals regarding the
availability in public liability suits of medical-monitoring claims,
which can be cast as “future” injuries. Second, in order to avoid
excessive costs to defendants, a minimum exposure threshold must be
set below which plaintiffs cannot sue. Although such a threshold
currently exists in the form of NRC-created exposure regulations for
the public, such regulations are not always binding in PAA suits, and
in any event, are set significantly below levels at which increased
cancer rates would be expected.

241. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 884–85 (“The proportionality rule simply holds the
defendant liable for no more (and no less) than the disease losses it has caused in the ‘body’ of
the exposed population. The defendant never overpays, and the population as a whole gains no
windfall.”). For a discussion of how courts might permit each party subjected to excess risk to
sue by allowing claims for “future” injuries, see infra Part V.A.
242. See id. at 892 (raising, but rejecting, concerns that endorsing a proportional-liability
rule “would enable mass exposure suits to enter the system in far greater numbers and flood the
courts with petty and spurious claims”). For a discussion of how to prevent overdeterring
defendants in suits for low-level emissions, see infra Part V.B.
243. See supra Part I.B.
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A. Imposing Sufficient Deterrence Costs on Defendants: Permitting
Suit for Future Injuries
Compensating only those plaintiffs who have developed cancer
does not address the risk that others in the community will develop
244
cancer in the future.
To prevent public liability cases from
systematically undercompensating those harmed by the nuclearpower-production industry, it must be possible for all individuals
likely to be harmed to be able to sue before their harms are realized.
In previous cases, public liability claimants have explored the
possibility of recovering for their increased risk of contracting cancer
245
by classifying their injuries as subcellular damage, emotional
246
247
distress, or an ongoing need for medical monitoring.
At the moment, federal courts diverge on whether public liability
suits permit awards for radiation exposure alone. Although Congress
did not use phrases such as “medical monitoring” or “cellular
damage,” the PAA appears to limit plaintiffs to suing for property
248
damage and “bodily injury.” Generally, claims for increased risks of
249
harm were not compensated at common law, and courts have
tended to interpret the PAA’s “bodily injury” language as a sign that
Congress also intended to prohibit suits for personal injury until the
250
onset of cancers. Although other courts have concluded that

244. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
245. Compare Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 569–71 (9th Cir. 2008)
(denying that subcellular damage is a redressable harm under the PAA), with Rainer v. Union
Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 618, 622 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the PAA defers the issue
of recovery for subcellular damage to state law, and that Kentucky law precludes recovery).
246. Compare Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Grp., Inc., 528 F.3d 681, 683–84 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that recovery for emotional-distress claims in the absence of physical injury is
inconsistent with the PAA), with Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200
(D.N.M. 2005) (holding that recovery for emotional-distress claims is not inconsistent with the
PAA).
247. Compare In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009–10 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that recovery for medical-monitoring claims in the absence of physical injury is
inconsistent with the PAA), with Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2003)
(implicitly permitting medical-monitoring claims to proceed).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (2012) (defining a “nuclear incident” as an event that causes
“bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of
property” as a result of radioactive materials).
249. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
88.
250. See, e.g., In re Berg Litig., 293 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in terms
of recovery for increased risk of harm, medical-monitoring claims are equivalent to
noncompensable claims for “emotional distress”); June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234,
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radiation exposure itself can constitute an injury under the PAA,
substantive state law often bars recovery. For example, in Rainer v.
252
Union Carbide Corp., the Sixth Circuit held that the PAA’s “bodily
injury” requirement did not preclude recovery for increased risk of
harm, but observed that Kentucky state law precludes plaintiffs’
253
claims absent a showing of present physical injury. Accordingly, any
proportional-liability regime that relies on claimants to sue for
increased risk of injury would, at the moment, be subject to two-fold
uncertainty: fractured opinions interpreting the PAA in the federal
254
judiciary, accompanied by wide divergence in tort law across the
255
states.
To surmount this legal uncertainty, the PAA should be amended
to permit broader recovery for radiation-related increases in cancer
256
risk. Permitting suit by all parties exposed to increased risk of harm
1248 (10th Cir. 2009) (dismissing medical-monitoring claims “because they do not assert a
‘bodily injury,’ as required for jurisdiction under the Price-Anderson Act”).
251. See, e.g., Day v. NLO, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 869, 881 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (deeming medicalmonitoring claims appropriate with an adequate showing of increased risk of injury); cf. Dodge
v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 2000) (implicitly permitting medical-monitoring
claims to proceed). The Fifth Circuit recently found that because the “bodily injury” language is
used to define a “nuclear incident,” the PAA should not be read to prohibit recovery for other
injuries once an underlying nuclear incident has been demonstrated. Cotroneo v. Shaw Env’t &
Infrastructure, Inc., 639 F.3d 186, 198 (5th Cir. 2011). The court “respectfully disagree[d]” that
nonlisted harms like medical monitoring were necessarily excluded. Id. at 199 n.15.
252. Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2005).
253. Id. at 618–22. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit does not consider the meaning of the
“bodily injury” requirement to be fodder for state law. See Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech.
Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Unlike the Sixth Circuit, we have never relied on state
law to interpret bodily injury. . . . The Act doesn’t call for us to apply state law in its
interpretation . . . .”).
254. See Nathan White, Note, Arguments Not Raised: How the Plaintiffs’ Missed
Opportunity Led to the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in June v. Union Carbide Corp., 2011 BYU L.
REV. 245, 250–57 (detailing the circuit split over recovery for medical-monitoring claims under
the PAA). Judges also disagree over whether the “bodily injury” requirement is substantive or
merely jurisdictional. Compare Cotroneo, 639 F.3d at 200 (Dennis, J., dissenting in part) (noting
that the “bodily injury” requirement is a threshold jurisdictional question), with In re Hanford
Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that personal-injury
claims in the absence of bodily injury necessarily fail to state a claim).
255. See supra note 253. A Sixth Circuit PAA plaintiff may sue for medical monitoring in
the absence of physical injury in Ohio, but not in Michigan or Kentucky. See D. Scott Aberson,
Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the Minnesota Supreme
Court Should Take when Confronted with the Issue, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1114–16
(2012) (undertaking a fifty-state survey of medical-monitoring law).
256. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10,
at 57 (recommending that the Presidential Commission’s changes to the PAA be enacted into
law because judicial application of the same principles could be unconstitutional or
inconsistent).
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would not only provide a more precise and more predictable means
257
of addressing the social harm caused by the nuclear industry, but
would reduce the costs incurred by all parties. Under current law,
public liability suits are purely ex post remedies, forcing defendants to
wait through an unpredictable latency period before plaintiffs may
258
bring suit. In the meantime, the responsibility for seeking cancer
screening or treatment is left to unidentifiable and unaware claimants,
who may suffer much greater injuries as a result. But if an entire
community exposed to radiation has standing to sue, plaintiffs can
secure, ex ante, the benefits of prepaid cancer screenings and
259
prophylactic care. Nuclear insurers might also benefit from this
approach, as early diagnoses could reduce the total compensation to
260
claimants who ultimately develop cancer.
Although proportional liability deters defendants more
accurately with respect to the total amount of harm caused regardless
of who receives the compensation, making up-front payouts to each
community member may also be viewed as undercompensating
plaintiffs who develop cancer for their actual damages and
261
overcompensating those who never develop cancer. Accordingly,
proportional-liability proponents recommend that once a
community’s increased risk of injury has been shown, a rainy-day
fund—corresponding in size to the degree of increased risk—should
262
be established and conserved to compensate future cancer victims.
Payouts could be made periodically as individuals developed
263
radiation-induced cancers, and in the meantime, smaller portions of
264
the fund could be used to pay for cancer screenings and other
257. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
258. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10,
at 88 (identifying “the problem of whether to make payments shortly after the accident because
of the possibility of latent illnesses emerging later” as one issue of the current legal regime).
259. See id. at 108 (recommending the approach of permitting plaintiffs to sue for their
increased risk of developing cancer).
260. Id. at 91.
261. Id. at 102.
262. See Estep, supra note 221, at 281 (arguing for a “contingent injury fund” in radiationrelated injury cases proportionate in size to the increased risk of latent disease in the
community); Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 919–20 (proposing the creation of insurance funds in
mass-tort cases to insure against increased risks of disease).
263. See Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 920 (describing gradual insurance payouts).
264. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, supra note 10, at
114. Interim medical screenings might include complete physicals for detecting various forms of
cancer and follow-up appointments for abnormalities known to be sensitive to radiation
exposure, such as thyroid nodules. Id. at 114 n.41.
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prophylactic measures, ultimately reducing the defendant’s total
liability. The funds could even provide for corrective measures to
account for deviations from expected cancer rates, with courts
extracting additional amounts from the nuclear-insurance pools when
the incidence of cancer is higher than expected or returning excess
compensation to the industry after a fixed period when fewer injuries
265
Creating community-based
materialize than were anticipated.
compensation funds is a particularly attractive solution for radiationrelated injuries because the PAA has already established a large
mutual-insurance pool from which compensation can be withdrawn
266
and into which it can be deposited as necessary.
B. Avoiding Excessive Costs to Defendants: Addressing Low-Level
Emissions
Some concerns remain that implementing proportional liability
in mass-tort cases might open the litigation floodgates to claims
267
previously dammed up by the preponderance rule. Proportional
liability discourages needless litigation because plaintiffs would
recover little for a marginally increased risk of developing cancer, but
the possibility remains that a potential class of sufficient size might
nonetheless tempt unscrupulous plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring
268
unmeritorious or weak claims to extract a settlement. In this
scenario, proportional liability could be used to make the nuclear
industry’s litigation costs more—rather than less—uncertain,
permitting baseless claims to deplete insurance funds and deter
investment in nuclear-power production. To eliminate this risk of
overdeterrence, nuclear operators should not be held liable for
minimal radiation releases.

265. See id. at 91 (“Moreover, because less harm will be sustained when disease is
detected . . . and treated at an early stage, such a program will likely reduce the future losses
suffered by individuals as the result of latent injury.”); Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 920 (“The
firm could endow the reserve through periodic contributions and might vary the amount of the
reserve as more accurate information about the incidence of disease became available over
time.”).
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring nuclear operators to participate in
primary and secondary financial-protection insurance pools). ANI might ultimately return
unused funds to its operators, as it does with its litigation reserves. See supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
267. Rosenberg, supra note 159, at 894.
268. See id. at 894–95 (noting that a potential increase in litigation under proportional
liability is only feasible if previously unmarketable claims are aggregated in sufficient number to
yield a positive return on investment).
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The “fault” standard for nuclear operators has received
269
substantial attention in Congress. Although the hazardous nature of
nuclear materials would have made the nuclear industry a prime
candidate for strict liability, the federal government’s longstanding
monopoly over nuclear power prevented states from creating
270
coherent strict-liability doctrines as applied to nuclear activities.
Instead, Congress required defendants to waive all fault-based
271
defenses for any event deemed to be an ENO. In practice, however,
questions of fault are still commonly litigated because no nuclear
272
event has been declared an ENO —the Three Mile Island incident
273
included. Although there is no question that strict liability applies in
major nuclear incidents, the PAA’s fault standard is subject to state274
by-state variation in smaller cases that, taken together, might strain
nuclear-insurance pools under a proportional-liability regime.
After years without a unitary fault standard, every federal
appellate court considering the question of the “standard of care”
owed under the PAA has found that public liability claimants must
275
plead a radioactive release in excess of NRC guidelines. Conceding
that the PAA demands the use of substantive state tort law for fault,
269. See AM. ENTER. INST., RENEWAL OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT (1985) (describing
the debates over whether the ENO provision was too high of a threshold to trigger strict
liability, and whether the distinction was irrelevant because applicable state law would require
strict liability anyway).
270. See Price-Anderson Act Amendments of 1985: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy
Research and Dev. of the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources on S. 1225, 99th Cong.
232–33 (1985) (statement of Ms. Van Heijenoort) (“Because of the existence of the Atomic
Energy Act, I don’t think most States have developed law specifically on strict liability with
respect to nuclear incidents in the nontechnical term. It may be that one could successfully
argue that dealing with nuclear material is ultrahazardous and get a State court or a Federal
court in applying State law to apply strict liability, but I don’t think we can assume the courts
necessarily do that right now.”).
271. For further discussion of the ENO standard, see supra Part I.B.
272. O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc. No. 97-CV-1554 DT, 2005 WL 6035255, at *37 n.46
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2005) (“No ENO has been declared by the NRC or the United States to
date . . . .”).
273. Three Mile Island, 45 Fed. Reg. 27,590, 27,591 (Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n Apr. 23,
1980).
274. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (2012) (deferring the PAA’s “substantive rules for decision” to
state law).
275. E.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008);
Roberts v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 146 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998); O’Conner v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1100 (7th Cir. 1994); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol.
II, 940 F.2d 832, 859 (3d Cir. 1991). Some district courts in other circuits have come to the same
conclusion. E.g., Bohrmann v. Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F. Supp. 211, 220 (D. Me.
1996); Corcoran v. N.Y. Power Auth., 935 F. Supp. 376, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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276

these courts concluded, relying on the AEA’s preemption of
nuclear-safety regulation, that state judges would look to federal
277
regulations to decide the standard of care anyway. Accordingly,
plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s conduct could have exposed
them to some level of radiation at which defendants could be
278
sanctioned by the NRC.
Although the consistency achieved among most circuits is
heartening, it is not clear that tacking the fault standard to NRC
emissions guidelines would be an adequate bar to frivolous suits
under a proportional-liability regime. Indeed, merely requiring a
radiation emission to exceed “federal guidelines” may impose a
punitively low threshold for civil liability:
[T]he various limits in present NRC regulations . . . have been set at
a level which is conservatively arrived at by incorporating a
significant safety factor . . . . [A] discharge or dispersal which
exceeds the limits in NRC regulations . . . is not one which would be
expected to cause substantial injury or damage unless it exceeds by
279
some significant multiple the appropriate regulatory limit.

The standards set for emissions from nuclear facilities are designed to
allow the NRC to identify deviations from normal industry practices,
not to assess whether any individual could be harmed as a result of
280
that deviation.
Even more concerning, some district courts have held that the
standard of care imposed by NRC guidelines is a regulatory
281
aspiration for doses that are “as low as reasonably achievable”

276. Noting that the PAA provides that a state’s duty of care might not be “inconsistent”
with the terms of the PAA, the Tenth Circuit questioned whether Colorado tort law was
necessarily preempted by federal safety standards at the time of the allegedly tortious conduct.
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010). On remand, the court found
that state tort-law claims for radiation-related injuries are implicitly preempted by the PAA’s
statutory framework. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 90-cv-001818-JLK, Nuclear Reg.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,747, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 28, 2014) (“A failed PAA claim based on an alleged
nuclear incident is simply a failed claim, not a state-law claim in waiting.”).
277. See supra note 275.
278. See, e.g., O’Conner, 13 F.3d at 1105 (refusing to create inconsistent standards for
federal nuclear-safety regulations and tort liability).
279. Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 570–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
10 C.F.R. § 140.81(b)(1) (2007)).
280. See 10 C.F.R. § 140.81(b)(1) (2014) (“It should be clearly understood that [these]
criteria in no way establish or indicate that there is a specific threshold of exposure at which
biological damage from radiation will take place.”).
281. Radiation Protection Programs, 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101(a) (2014).
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282

(ALARA). As the Third Circuit has observed, lowering the fault
standard to such a degree effectively gives the jury broad discretion
over the question of the applicable standard of care, permitting a
finding that exposing members of the public to any degree of
283
radiation may be a breach of duty in tort. Certainly, the linear nothreshold model suggests that even minimal radiation exposure may
284
be the cause of an individual’s cancer. But if the infinitesimal
radiation releases incident to a defendant’s normal operations can
serve as a basis for imposing liability on nuclear-power plants, then no
285
such facility could ever be considered to operate safely.
Even today, the low fault threshold enforced by most courts does
not help prevent frivolous litigation. This failure at the fault threshold
misses an opportunity to screen out such litigation because claims that
cannot surmount the barrier of the NRC’s radiation-protection
286
standards would also be unable to show causation. Although
applying proportional liability would more accurately internalize the
nuclear industry’s cost to society, permitting recovery for an increased
risk of harm without a minimum-exposure standard might transform
the PAA from a reasoned limitation on nuclear liability into an
287
“unlocked cash register.” A unitary federal fault threshold would
help assure the nuclear industry that the benefits of proportional

282. See McCafferty v. Centerior Serv. Co., 983 F. Supp. 715, 719 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding
that the defendant had a duty to keep radiation releases “as low as reasonably achievable”);
Tang v. S. Cal. Edison Co., No. 93-1308 GT, 1993 WL 839708, at *1, (S.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1993)
(finding that defendants’ standard of care includes ALARA); Crawford v. Nat’l Lead Co., 784
F. Supp. 439, 447 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (finding that defendants “exceeded the dose limits” set by
applicable regulations by “violating the ‘as low as reasonably achievable’ (ALARA)
requirement”); In re Fernald, No. C-1-85-149, 1989 WL 267040, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 1989)
(“We remain unpersuaded by defendants’ argument that ALARA is merely an ‘approach’ to
radiation emissions, and sets no quantifiable legal standard. Rather, we conclude that
defendants violated ALARA when and if they exposed the public . . . .”); cf. Cook v. Rockwell
Int’l Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1151 (D. Colo. 2006) (admitting expert testimony based on the
ALARA standard). But cf. Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 858–59 (W.D.
Tex. 2005) (excluding expert testimony incorporating the ALARA standard).
283. See In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1115–16 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Adoption of a standard as vague
as ALARA would give no real guidance to operators and would allow juries to fix the standard
case by case and plant by plant. An operator acting in the utmost good faith and diligence could
still find itself liable for failing to meet such an elusive and undeterminable standard.”).
284. See supra notes 115–29 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part II.
286. See supra Part II.
287. Dumontier v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 543 F.3d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 2008). Judge
Kozinski expressed concern that the PAA’s existing fault standards would be an inadequate bar
to liability if plaintiffs could recover for radiation exposure alone. Id. at 570–71.

O’CONNELL IN FC (DO NOT DELETE)

376

11/21/2014 6:37 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:333

liability would not be washed away by waves of unmeritorious
litigation.
CONCLUSION
The science of nuclear causation—like the modern nuclear
industry—is better measured by the risks involved than by a
smattering of anecdotal tales, news reports, and hearsay. Just as no
expert, judge, or jury can definitively know who has been harmed by
radiation from the nuclear industry and who has not, so too is it
impossible to know what the future holds for the legal regime
governing nuclear operators in the United States. What can be said
with certainty is that failing to take any risks, whether in building new
power sources, spurring investments in new technology, or developing
new legal doctrines, poses the even greater threat of failing to address
rules that are widely acknowledged to be obsolete and inefficient.
Although the proportional-liability approach to nuclear causation
remains untested, its benefits cannot be realized until the country is
prepared to take that necessary first step into the novel.

